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CHAPTER 1 
GENDER INDICATORS AS GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE: NOT YOUR FATHER’S 
WORLD BANK 
■   ■   ■ 
Catherine Powell* 
As feminism has come of age, it has powerfully instantiated itself 
into global governance. What are the tools feminism has borrowed—even 
co-opted—to embed itself within governance? Do these tools enhance or 
diminish the liberatory potential of feminism? This chapter looks at one 
tool—the use of quantitative indicators to advance gender equality in 
global governance, with a focus on the World Bank’s relatively new 
Women, Business and the Law (WBL) program,1 as a microcosm of the 
recent explosion and popularity of gender indicators.2 
The claim that feminists (at least some) now “walk the halls of 
power”3 is captured in the construct, “Governance Feminism,” that Janet 
                                                                                 
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; Fellow, Council on 
Foreign Relations, Women and Foreign Affairs. The author wishes to thank the participants in 
the Berkeley International Law and Politics Colloquium, the Georgetown Law Faculty 
Workshop, and the 2012 Law and Society Annual Meeting session on “The Politics of Indicators: 
Contestation and Resistance.” Special thanks are due to David Caren, Thomas Ginsburg, Caren 
Grown, Janet Halley, Sarah Iqbal, Jeni Klugman, David Law, Katarina Linos, Naomi Mezey, 
Sally Engle Merry, Nina Pillard, Margaret Satterthwaite, Jane Stromseth, Dorothy Thomas, Yofi 
Tirosh, and Robin West, who provided valuable comments and support. I am also grateful to my 
superb research assistants Stephany Fan, Denise Bell, and Rebecca Stellato at Georgetown 
University Law Center during my 2012–13 visiting professorship there and Christine Calabrese 
and Devan Grossblatt at Fordham University School of Law. 
1 See Women, Business and the Law, WORLD BANK, http://wbl.worldbank.org (last visited 
July 5, 2015). 
2 For examples of the rise of gender indicators, see, e.g., Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary 
of State, U.S. Department of State, Remarks at the Evidence and Impact: Closing the Gender 
Data Gap Conference, http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/07/195244.htm 
(July 19, 2012); Jim Kim, President, World Bank, Remarks at the Evidence and Impact: Closing 
the Gender Data Gap Conference, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/speech/2012/07/19/
remarks-world-bank-group-president-jim-yong-kim-evidence-impact-closing-gender-gap (July 19, 
2012) (personally launching a gender data portal in one of his first public appearances as Bank 
President; the Evidence and Impact conference was co-hosted by the World Bank, the U.S. State 
Department, and the polling firm, Gallup); U.N. Secretary-General, Women and Peace and 
Security: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. DOC. S/2010/173 (Apr. 6, 2010) (gender indicators 
developed to evaluate and facilitate the integration of gender in peace and security). 
3 JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM 21 
(2006) [hereinafter HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS]. 
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Halley et al. promote.4 However, Governance Feminism has its costs:   
“Women benefit differentially; some are harmed; and conflicts among 
feminists about what worlds to imagine are prematurely settled.”5  As 
Dianne Otto notes, efforts to theorize about Governance Feminism should 
engage with “familiar accounts of feminist attempts to engage with 
international law and its institutions, [which] tell a saga of [ongoing] 
‘marginalisation,’ ‘silencing,’ and ‘talking to ourselves.’ ”6 Exploring the 
complexity—indeed the paradox—of Governance Feminism, Halley and 
her coauthors explore its limitations and risks, even as they celebrate its 
achievements.7  
This chapter draws on the notion of Governance Feminism to 
examine how feminism has become embedded in the World Bank through 
the use of gender indicators that measure the legal rights of women on a 
country-by-country basis. I conclude that while feminism has shaped the 
way the Bank pursues law and development, the transformative potential 
of feminism within the Bank has been limited. Even as feminism has 
influenced the Bank’s policies and funding, the Bank has in turn co-opted 
feminism to advance the Bank’s economic growth agenda. 
I ground these conclusions about feminism and its limits through 
exploration of two clusters of questions about gender indicators at the 
World Bank. First, what do gender indicators tell us about whether 
feminism is changing global governance or whether governance is 
changing feminism? Does governance by indicators have a deradicalizing 
effect on feminism? Put another way, can feminism use the master’s tools 
(i.e., indicators) to dismantle the master’s house (i.e., the current 
structure of global governance, which incorporates male privilege) or at 
least substantially renovate it?8 
                                                                                 
4 Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir & Chantal Thomas, From the 
International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex 
Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 335 
(2006) [hereinafter Halley et al., Governance Feminism]. Others view this phenomenon through 
the lens of “gender mainstreaming,” but this chapter focuses on the intertwining of feminism and 
governance. 
5 Janet Halley, Describing and Assessing Governance Feminism, Chapter 1 in Janet Halley, 
Prabha Kotiswaran, Rachel Rebouche, and Hila Shamir, Governance Feminism: An Introduction 
at 4 (Minn. U.P. forthcoming).  “Merging into the mainstream can ….  consolidate a 
particularistic, identity-based project, sometimes at the expense of alternative affiliations that 
ignore the siren call of victimization and identity .... [and] [s]ome of the best things within and 
about feminism get left out.”  Id.  
6 Dianne Otto, Power and Danger: Feminist Engagement with International Law Through 
the UN Security Council, 32 AUSTL. FEMINIST L.J. 97 (2010) (internal citations omitted). 
7 HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 3, at 29–32; Halley et al., Governance Feminism, 
supra note 4, at 341–42.  
8 See AUDRE LORDE, The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House, in 
SISTER OUTSIDER 110, 112 (1984) (“For the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s 
house. They may allow us temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they will never enable us 
to bring about genuine change.”); see also Otto, supra note 5, at 98 (invoking Lorde as a critique 
of Governance Feminism). 
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Second, when indicators are used to measure legal rights in the 
context of gender equality, what do these quantitative measurements 
make visible, and what do they obscure? What are the normative and 
practical implications of this for feminism? And what are the implications 
of economizing gender equality for feminism?9 
Other scholarship on Governance Feminism (and critiques of it) 
centers on criminal punishment, specifically in the context of sexual 
violence in war and trafficking.10 This scholarship identifies “ ‘the fierce 
turn in American feminism toward the state,’ ” particularly the tendency 
toward criminalizing “ ‘bad things that men did to women[.]’ ”11 In 
shifting from international criminal law to law and development, this 
chapter analyzes the turn to the state as regards government and 
intergovernmental development efforts that promote monetizing and 
quantifying feminist values through indicators. 
Numeric indicators are a classic governance device for identification, 
allocation, and evaluation. Tracing the “genealogy of indicators,” 
anthropologist Sally Engle Merry describes the rise of indicators as a 
“project of modernity,” noting: 
Numbers as an instrument of knowledge production were 
developed first for business transactions . . . and subsequently as 
instruments of state governance . . . for administration and tax 
. . . , but it is only with the development of the modern state that 
statistics have been used to describe the characteristics of 
populations themselves.12 
Within legal scholarship, the continued growth of empirical studies, 
such as law and economics, has proliferated. Within the development 
field, indicators drive decision-making in policy and program design, 
                                                                                 
9 Cf. GALIT A. SARFATY, VALUES IN TRANSLATION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CULTURE OF 
THE WORLD BANK 107, 126 (2012) [hereinafter SARFATY, VALUES IN TRANSLATION] (discussing 
the trend toward economizing human rights within the World Bank): 
[T]hings really happen in the Bank when an economic case could be made for them. You put 
[them] in economic language. . . . It [ ] became acceptable internally to talk about corruption 
when people could show with cross-country regressions that it’s related to lower growth. . . . 
People needed [economic-based evidence] to say that “OK, it’s all right for us to work on this.” So 
one obstacle would be to try and articulate rights issues in the way that economists could 
understand. 
Id. at 127 (quoting a March 14, 2006, interview with an official with the World Bank 
Development Research Group); see also id. at 131 (discussing quantifying the social capital 
concept and translating it econometrically). 
10 See, e.g., Halley et al., Governance Feminism, supra note 4; Otto, supra note 5; Kelly 
Askin, A Decade of the Development of Gender Crimes in International Courts and Tribunals: 
1993 to 2003, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 10TH Anniversary Issue at 16 (2004). 
11 John Sutherland, The Ideas Interview: Janet Halley, GUARDIAN (Aug. 7, 2006), http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/aug/08/gender.academicexperts (interview quoting Halley). 
12 Sally Engle Merry, Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights, and Global 
Governance, 52 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY S83, S89 (2011) [hereinafter Merry, Measuring the 
World]. 
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implementation, and monitoring and evaluation.13 This chapter 
synthesizes feminist criticism, empirical studies, and law and 
development14 to analyze the emergence of gender indicators as a tool of 
global governance in vital decisions concerning the allocation of law and 
development assistance.15 
The World Bank promotes a dual narrative about why gender 
equality as a legal norm matters for development. First, “gender equality 
matters in its own right, because the ability to live the life of one’s own 
choosing and be spared from absolute deprivation is a basic human right, 
to be enjoyed by everyone, whether one is male or female.”16 Second, 
gender equality “matters instrumentally, because greater gender equality 
contributes to economic efficiency and the achievement of other key 
development outcomes.”17 
While focused on the World Bank’s WBL program, this chapter 
considers the broader ecology within which gender indicators have 
flourished, to identify lessons about law reform, global governance, and 
transnational feminism. In so doing, I examine the implications of 
utilizing a technology of corporate governance—numerical measurement 
                                                                                 
13 See, e.g., WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT: GENDER EQUALITY AND 
DEVELOPMENT 37 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 WDR ON GENDER]; USAID, GENDER EQUALITY AND 
FEMALE EMPOWERMENT POLICY 1 (2012), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACT200.pdf 
[hereinafter USAID, POLICY]; Memorandum from the Development Economics Vice Presidency 
and Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network for World Bank’s staff, Engendering 
Justice: A Gender Assessment’s Impact on Project Design (May 2005), available at http://www1.
worldbank.org/prem/PREMNotes/premnote98.pdf; Preface, in Andrew D. Mason & Elizabeth M. 
King, ENGENDERING DEVELOPMENT—THROUGH GENDER EQUALITY IN RIGHTS, RESOURCES, AND 
VOICE xii (2001), available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/01/891686/
engendering-development-through-gender-equality-rights-resources-voice. 
14 Note that the law and development field itself sits at the intersection of economic, legal, 
and institutional theory. See David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos, Introduction: The Third Moment 
in Law and Development Theory and the Emergence of a New Critical Practice, in THE NEW LAW 
AND DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 1 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) 
[hereinafter Trubek & Santos, New Critical Practice]. 
15 This builds on my broader interest in new governance approaches (beyond gender) to 
diagnosing, managing, and solving transnational problems. See, e.g., Catherine Powell, Libya: A 
Multilateral Constitutional Moment?, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 298 (2012). 
16 2012 WDR ON GENDER, supra note 14, at 47. 
17 Id.; see also SARFATY, VALUES IN TRANSLATION, supra note 10, at 115–20 (discussing the 
Bank’s use of intrinsic and instrumentalist claims in the context of human rights). As discussed 
below in Part I, this dual frame has been echoed by the Obama Administration in the President’s 
first National Security Strategy. WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 38 (2010), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf [hereinafter 
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY]. Then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) Administrator Raj Shah each issued gender policy 
guidance, further raising the profile of this dual narrative within the Administration. See 
Clinton statement, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICY GUIDANCE: PROMOTING GENDER 
EQUALITY TO ACHIEVE OUR NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES (2012), 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/189379.pdf [hereinafter STATE POLICY 
GUIDANCE] (fact sheet) (summarizing internal policy guidance cable); Shah statement, USAID, 
POLICY, supra note 14, at iv. 
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and analysis—as an instrument of the modern state and now, by 
extension, multi-governmental institutions.18 
The Bank is both an enormous producer of gender indicators and a 
consumer of them, in measuring patterns of and trends in gender 
inequality. These indicators inform the Bank’s own work and influence its 
partners (including aid recipients and donors) and other stakeholders. 
Increasingly, governments and international organizations have 
relied on quantitative indicators to make the case that investing in 
women and girls yields not only beneficial development outcomes for the 
sake of women and girls themselves, but also positive outcomes for whole 
communities, for whole nations, and even for the pursuit of international 
peace and prosperity.19 Further, the claim is that investing in women and 
girls leads to more sustainable outcomes and is thus a more efficient use 
of resources than prior development strategies that failed to use gender 
as a pathway for scarce, targeted resources.20 
The goal of this chapter is to interrogate what is gained and what is 
lost through the use of gender indicators in the service of these ambitious 
claims. Do such quantitative metrics make gender inequality more visible 
and therefore more susceptible to remediation? Does the use of data 
create (at least the illusion of) greater objectivity and accountability (to 
taxpayers at the national level and shareholders within international 
financial institutions)? 
Conversely, in what ways do numbers obscure certain forms of 
gender dominance and subordination that are not easily reducible to 
quantification (such as gender-based violence and women’s empowerment 
and autonomy)? Empiricism often relies on proxies to measure these 
phenomena. But is the solution to come up with more and better data? 
Because international law has been traditionally based on relations 
between states, feminist theorists have criticized its structure for 
masking gender inequality in the private sphere (for example, in the 
market) and by private actors (for example, by obscuring accountability 
for gender- and sexual-based violence by an abusive spouse or a private 
                                                                                 
18 For a broader consideration of the use of indicators in transnational law and regulation, 
see, for example, Kevin E. Davis, Benedict Kingsbury & Sally Engle Merry, Introduction: Global 
Governance by Indicators, in KEVIN E. DAVIS, ANGELINA FISHER, BENEDICT KINGSBURY & SALLY 
ENGLE MERRY, GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS: GLOBAL POWER THROUGH QUANTIFICATION 
CLASSIFICATION AND RANKINGS, at 3 (2012)[hereinafter Davis, Kingsbury & Merry, Global 
Governance by Indicators] (collection of case studies across various fields of transnational law). 
19 See, e.g., Melanne Verveer, Why Women Are a Foreign Policy Issue, FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 
12, 2012), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/23/why_women_are_a_foreign_policy_
issue (the author here was then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s Ambassador-at-Large for 
Global Women’s Issues from 2009 to early 2013); 2012 WDR ON GENDER, supra note 14. 
20 See, e.g., USAID, POLICY, supra note 14, at 1; 2012 WDR ON GENDER, supra note 14. 
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militia leader).21 This chapter investigates whether and how the use of 
gender indicators fits into these and other prevailing accounts and/or 
critiques of international law and global regulation. 
The chapter is organized around five parts. Part I analyzes the World 
Bank’s dual narrative on why gender equality matters for development. 
The fact that the instrumental value of gender equality (as told through 
gender indicators) has been emphasized over its intrinsic value 
represents a strategic choice to get institutional buy-in. But it also 
represents a normative choice that has practical implications. Part II 
discusses the rise of indicators as a mode of governance, including in the 
development assistance field and, by extension, the law and development 
field. Part III gives an overview of the burgeoning construction and use of 
gender indicators as a mode of Governance Feminism within the United 
Nations (U.N.) family (including within the World Bank’s WBL program) 
in response to earlier indicators that were insufficiently attentive to 
gender. Part IV summarizes criticism of gender indicators for falling 
short themselves in the way they have been conceived, interpreted, and 
deployed. Much of the criticism of gender indicators involves 
methodological arguments, rather than arguments questioning the 
normative implications of relying on indicators as a way of evaluating 
gender justice. Building on these critiques, Part V circles back to the 
normative—and by extension practical—implications of the turn to 
gender indicators (and the motives underlying them), concluding with 
thoughts about how gender indicators might fit more meaningfully into 
the feminist project. 
I. THE WORLD BANK’S DUAL NARRATIVE: THE 
INTRINSIC AND INSTRUMENTAL VALUE 
OF GENDER EQUALITY 
While highlighting both the intrinsic value and the instrumental 
value of gender equality, the World Bank’s work inherently privileges the 
latter. Because of its role as a development institution that privileges 
economic growth and efficiency, the Bank views gender primarily from a 
cost-benefit perspective. Even though the Bank’s core mission is to “[e]nd 
extreme poverty within a generation and boost shared prosperity”22 – and 
its agenda has expanded to include a comprehensive set of programs to 
advance this mission – its comparative advantage is economics and 
promoting market-friendly policies.23 
                                                                                 
21 See Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to 
International Law, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 613 (1991), and its progeny for an example of 
groundbreaking feminist critique. 
22 About, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/about (last visited Aug. 12, 2013). 
23 Jessica Einhorn, Interview with the Author, FOREIGN AFFS. (Sept. 1, 2001), http://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/64199/jessica-einhorn/interview-with-the-author (response to letters 
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The Bank’s 2012 World Development Report—which took gender 
equality and development as the primary theme—is an example of this 
dual narrative.24 The Report initially states that gender equality is a core 
objective with its own intrinsic value. It describes gender equality as “a 
process of expanding freedoms equally for all people.”25 
However, the Report then largely focuses on the instrumental 
justification for gender equality as being “smart economics.”26 From the 
Bank’s perspective, gender equality is “an instrument for development” 
because “it can enhance economic efficiency and improve other 
development outcomes in three ways.”27 First, eliminating gender 
barriers in education, economic opportunities, and productive inputs “can 
generate broad productivity gains[.]”28 Second, “improving women’s 
absolute and relative status feeds many other development outcomes, 
including those for their children.”29 Third, gender equality is an 
instrument for development through “leveling the playing field—where 
women and men have equal chances to become socially and politically 
active, make decisions, and shape policies,” which is more “likely to lead 
over time to more representative, and more inclusive, institutions and 
policy choices and thus to a better development path” overall.30 
This emphasis on the instrumental value of gender equality over its 
intrinsic value is an institutionally strategic decision. The World Bank, 
the United Nations system generally, and national governments have 
sought to mainstream gender throughout their organizational structures. 
Pitching gender equality as facilitating broader goals of these institutions 
is more likely to secure buy-in by the leadership of these organizations, 
who are frequently men or, regardless of their gender, may not 
necessarily view gender equality as an institutional priority. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
in reaction to the author’s earlier piece, The World Bank’s Mission Creep, FOREIGN AFFS. 
(Sept./Oct. 2001), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/57235/jessica-einhorn/the-
world-banks-mission-creep#). 
24 2012 WDR ON GENDER, supra note 14. 
25 Id. at 3 (citing and paraphrasing AMARTYA K. SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999) 
[hereinafter SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM]). The Bank’s Report also cites to MDG3 and the 
main international treaty on women’s equality, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). See also GEND. & DEV. GRP. IN THE POVERTY 
REDUCTION & ECON. NETWORK, WORLD BANK, GENDER EQUALITY AS SMART ECONOMICS: A WORK 
IN PROGRESS (2011), also available at http://bit.ly/1ospFzE [hereinafter GENDER EQUALITY AS 
SMART ECONOMICS]. 
26 2012 WDR ON GENDER, supra note 14. To be fair, a section of the Report focuses on 
“promoting women’s agency[,]” which, along with other references sprinkled throughout the 
Report, includes references to the ways in which women’s agency “has intrinsic relevance for 
women’s individual well-being and quality of life.” Id. at 151. Nevertheless, the bulk of the 
Report—even the section on women’s agency—is focused on the “instrumental relevance” of 
women’s equality and empowerment. 
27 Id. at 3. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
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Thus, increasingly, international organizations, national foreign 
ministries, and development agencies are touting the key links between 
gender equality on the one hand and economic prosperity and even world 
peace on the other. As the World Bank’s 2012 World Development Report 
says in its opening paragraph, “[g]reater gender equality can enhance 
productivity, improve development outcomes for the next generation, and 
make institutions more representative.”31 This is echoed in the U.S. 
National Security Strategy, which states, “[e]xperience shows that 
countries are more peaceful and prosperous when women are accorded 
full and equal rights and opportunity.”32 The World Bank views the 
monetary benefits of investing in women and girls as “smart economics.”33 
Similarly, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton refers to promoting 
the status of women as an exercise of “smart power.”34 
At the same time, economizing gender involves a process of 
translation that can be viewed as a form of adaptation to an 
organizational culture—or, as Sally Engle Merry puts it, a form of 
“vernacularization.”35 Economics and qualitative analysis are the 
                                                                                 
31 2012 WDR ON GENDER, supra note 14, at xx. 
32 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 18, at 38; see also Lucy Madison, In Farewell 
Speech, Clinton Calls for “Smart Power” on Global Stage, CBS NEWS (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.
cbsnews.com/8301–250_162–57566994/in-farewell-speech-clinton-calls-for-smart-power-on-global
-stage/ [hereinafter Madison, Farewell Speech] (quoting former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
as saying: “The jury is in. The evidence is absolutely indisputable: If women and girls 
everywhere were treated as equal to men in rights, dignity, and opportunity, we would see 
political and economic progress everywhere”); Mary-Katherine Ream, USAID Launches New 
Gender Policy, IIP DIGITAL (Mar. 1, 2012), http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2012/
03/201203011512.html#axzz2b6DzOGzH (“This is the first time in 30 years the U.S. government 
has updated and issued a formal approach to gender and development, officials said. It reveals a 
fundamental shift in the aid community’s conversation on women.”); Raj Shah (Administrator, 
USAID), White House USAID Gender Policy Launch Event (notes on file with the author) (“It’s 
been 30 years since the U.S. Government has issued a gender policy. This is shocking, given that 
we say woman are central to solving development problems.”). 
The first Gender Policy Guidance issued by the State Department notes: 
Evidence shows that investments in women’s employment, health, and education are 
correlated with greater economic growth and more successful development outcomes. 
Engaging women as political and social actors can change policy choices and makes 
institutions more representative and better performing. And a growing body of evidence 
shows that women bring a range of unique experiences and contributions in decision-
making on matters of peace and security that lead to improved outcomes in conflict 
prevention and resolution. 
STATE POLICY GUIDANCE, supra note 18; see also USAID, POLICY, supra note 14. 
33 See, e.g., GENDER EQUALITY AS SMART ECONOMICS, supra note 26; 2012 WDR ON 
GENDER, supra note 14, at xx (“Gender equality is . . . smart economics”); id. at 3 (“Gender 
equality matters for development—It is smart economics”). 
34 Madison, Farewell Speech, supra note 33 (quoting Clinton as pointing to gender equality 
as an example of smart power—a compromise between hard, military power and the soft power 
of moral suasion—because gender “is not only a moral issue. Which of course it is. It’s an 
economic issue and a security issue. . . . It therefore must be central to U.S. foreign policy”); see 
also Verveer, supra note 20 (“[P]romoting the status of women is not just a moral imperative but 
a strategic one; it’s essential to economic prosperity and to global peace and security. It is, in 
other words, a strategy for a smarter foreign policy.”). 
35 SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING 
INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE (2006). 
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vernacular of the World Bank. However, vernacularization has its limits, 
both as a normative matter and as a practical one. Normatively, 
vernacularization tends to involve adopting or co-opting the local culture. 
Therefore, liberatory projects such as feminism may be sapped of their 
emancipatory potential when confronting an organization’s dominant 
ideology.36 As Galit Sarfaty notes, “a paradox of vernacularization” is that 
a project that otherwise seeks to challenge practices, policies, and 
structures of an institution may end up losing its own normative valence 
in the face of a potentially more powerful one.37 
As a practical matter, the emphasis on quantitative measurement 
“neglects what cannot be counted”38 and obscures women’s empowerment, 
voice, and agency in favor of formal equality and efficiency. The emphasis 
on the instrumental value of gender equality fits into a broader trend 
toward “evidence-based investments”39 and “results-based 
management.”40 
This trend toward quantification often means that indicators are 
deployed as proxies to measure activities that are otherwise hard to 
quantify. For example, measures of “women’s empowerment” must rely on 
proxies of autonomy, such as whether a woman needs her husband’s 
permission to travel, sign a contract, buy land, etc., as a formal matter. In 
fact, whatever the law is in an area as a formal matter may be beside the 
point, if a woman can be barred from any of these activities as a matter of 
practice or custom. Similarly, activities (such as training programs, 
enrollment, or graduation rates) are presumed to correspond to particular 
outcomes (i.e., educational attainment),41 when in practice, women and 
girls may have difficulty participating fully in a program for any number 
of reasons, including violence, harassment, lack of child care, lack of safe 
and affordable transportation, etc. 
At the same time, gender indicators have helped advance a feminist 
agenda within the development landscape by threading the needle of 
instrumentalist economic growth and efficiency goals within narratives 
                                                                                 
36 SARFATY, VALUES IN TRANSLATION, supra note 10, at 151. 
37 Id. at 141. 
38 Sally Engle Merry, Firming Up Soft Law: The Impact of Indicators on Transnational 
Human Rights Legal Orders 38 (draft on file with author) [hereinafter Merry, Firming Up Soft 
Law]. 
39 USAID, POLICY, supra note 14, at 1; see also Danny Leipziger & Eckhard Deutscher, 
Foreword, in EQUALITY FOR WOMEN: WHERE DO WE STAND ON MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOAL 
3?, at xv (Mayra BuviniĆ et al. eds., 2008), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INT
GENDER/Resources/EqualityforWomenfinal.pdf (the coauthors worked for World Bank and 
OECD, respectively) (“There is compelling evidence of the importance of gender equality for 
poverty reduction and sustainable growth. So it should come as no surprise that most 
development actors—international agencies, bilateral donors, and most developing countries—
have an official policy for promoting gender equality.”) (emphasis added). 
40 UNDP, RESULTS BASED MANAGEMENT: CONCEPTS AND METHODOLOGY (2000), available 
at http://web.undp.org/evaluation/documents/RBMConceptsMethodgyjuly2002.pdf. 
41 Merry, Firming Up Soft Law, supra note 39, at 12. 
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concerning the intrinsic value of gender equality. This is apparent in the 
assessments gender indicators have helped shape—on a range of 
gendered phenomena—from “missing women” and “missing girls”42 to the 
“Girl Effect”43 to evaluating persistent gaps and discrimination in 
numerous areas. These narratives are powerful and penetrating, in large 
part because of the story the numbers tell. Girls and women are more 
likely to die; girls’ school enrollment continues to be low; women 
everywhere tend to earn less; women are more likely to do unpaid family 
work or to work in informal sectors; women are underrepresented in the 
upper echelons of formal politics and have less say in decisions and 
control over household resources.44 
The World Bank itself attributes the persistence of such gender 
inequalities to a variety of factors that numbers alone may not be able to 
fully diagnose, such as the fact that there may be: a single institution or 
policy “fix” that is blocked; multiple constraints that are mutually 
reinforcing (in ways that are not easily measurable); and entrenched 
                                                                                 
42 Amartya Sen, More Than 100 Million Women Are Missing, 37 N.Y. REV. BOOKS (1990), 
also available at http://ucatlas.ucsc.edu/gender/Sen100M.html (while the numbers have since 
been updated, Sen introduced the phenomenon and estimated that 100 million women were 
“missing”—their potential existence extinguished through sex-selective abortion, infanticide, or 
inadequate nutrition during infancy); see also 2012 WDR ON GENDER, supra note 14, at 15 
(discussing how the phenomenon of “missing girls” and “missing women” is based not only on 
preference for sons, discrimination, and social norms, but also on poor institutions that “force 
households to choose among many bad options” and “multiple service delivery options”). 
43 Prominently branded by the Nike Foundation, the “Girl Effect” relies on the empirical 
claim that “investing in a girl stops poverty before it starts.” NIKE FOUNDATION, http://nikeinc.
com/pages/the-nike-foundation/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2014); see also Stuart Elliot, Nike Harnesses 
Girl Effect Again, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/11/giving/
11VIDEO.html (tracing the roots of the “Girl Effect” campaign back to Nike’s “if you let me play” 
campaign regarding the participation of women and girls in sports, and noting that while the 
“Girl Effect” campaign rebrands poverty, it is purposefully not branded as Nike). Data on the 
“Girl Effect” website reflects that “when we all invest in girls, everyone wins[,]” since such 
investments lead to improvements in income (as each additional year of secondary school 
increases a girl’s eventual wages by 15 to 25 percent) and in health (as mothers get more 
schooling, their infants and children will be healthier). Id. An independent website on the “Girl 
Effect” campaign is available at http://youthinkyouknowme.girleffect.org/ (last visited Aug. 18, 
2014). Accord Rajiv Shah, Message from the Administrator, in USAID, POLICY, supra note 14 at 
iv (“[I]in other cases—boys are falling behind. With [the new USAID gender equality] policy, we 
can ensure our values and commitments are reflected in durable, meaningful results for all”); see 
also Judith Warner, Is There Really a ‘Boy Crisis’?, TIME IDEA (Mar. 21, 2013), http://ideas.time.
com/2013/03/21/the-boy-crisis-is-it-fictional/ (concluding, based on current research, that 
American boys face challenges due to gendered social experience and expectations as well as 
because of “class” (income and education level). The study recommends against “pit[ting] boys’ 
needs against those of girls or view[ing] one gender’s success as a zero-sum game that requires 
the relative failure of the other. . . . The solution is rather to realize that a rising tide of 
educational expectation will raise all boats”). 
44 2012 WDR ON GENDER, supra note 14, at xxi. Even in a rich country, such as the United 
States, women are at a disadvantage. “Women may control 65% of global spending, but in the 
United States, where that number is higher, we represent only 3% of Fortune 500 directors.” 
Dorothy Thomas, The W Factor: How Women Could Save the World (if only we would let them) at 
2 (on file with author). 
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social norms and gender roles, including notions surrounding caregiving 
and housework.45 
Such persistent governance dilemmas are as much about governance 
as about government. While the latter relies on “the assumption that all 
legal power inheres in the state and comes down from a pinnacle of 
legitimate coercive power[,]” a thicker understanding of Governance 
Feminism follows Michel Foucault’s distinction between managerial and 
sovereigntist forms of power.46 “Governance” implies “multiplicity, 
mobility, fragmentation, a regulatory or bureaucratic legal style, as well 
as ready facility with non-state and para-state institutional forms (NGOs, 
law school clinics, ad hoc expert groups doing letter writing 
campaigns).”47 
Steps to address persistent gender inequality are more sustainable 
when assessed and addressed through both bottom-up and top-down 
forms of governance.48 While top-down methods involve experts and other 
policymakers taking leadership in developing and/or imposing decisions, 
bottom-up solutions involve affected individuals and communities taking 
the lead in crafting and/or implementing decisions to improve their own 
destiny. As discussed further below, governance by indicators tends to be 
top-down (from international development agency or donor to national 
government to affected individuals or communities). 
Bottom-up decision-making may be better informed, more targeted, 
and more effective, as affected individuals and communities will likely 
feel greater ownership over the solutions and therefore have more of an 
interest in sustaining them. As a social justice method, bottom-up 
decision-making—which has deep roots in feminists’ consciousness-
raising methodologies—is also more likely to reflect the intrinsic value of 
gender equality or “the ability to live the life of one’s own choosing and be 
spared from absolute deprivation [as] a basic human right [equally 
available] for everyone, independent of whether one is male or female.”49 
While indicators appear objective, neutral, and scientific, their 
selection and reproduction often involve discretion, judgment, and 
preference, and they actually mask political struggle over questions of 
power, gender, development, corporate responsibility, rule of law, and 
human rights as “technical questions of measurement, criteria, and data 
                                                                                 
45 2012 WDR ON GENDER, supra note 14, at 13–14 (pointing, in particular, to the “sticky 
domains” of health and mortality, the economy, and agency in society and in household decision-
making). 
46 Halley et al., Governance Feminism, supra note 4, at 341 (relying on Michel Foucault, 
Governmentality, in THE ESSENTIAL WORKS OF FOUCAULT (1954–84) VOLUME 3: POWER 211 
(James D. Faubio ed., Robert Hurley trans., The New Press 2000)). 
47 Id. 
48 Cf. Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of 
Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125 (2005). 
49 2012 WDR ON GENDER, supra note 14, at 3. 
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accessibility.”50 Since such debates often rely on technical expertise, the 
creation and interpretation of an indicator frequently involves a “slippage 
[ ] in the way [ ] problems are defined, in the identity and role of experts, 
[and] in the relative power of the people engaged in producing and using 
the indicator[.]”51 
By exercising the “power of naming” in naming the category to be 
measured, determining what is included in or excluded from the category, 
and setting forth parameters for measurement, the use of an indicator is 
an exercise of hegemony.52 Indeed, indicators are typically created in the 
global North, even while the data collection (particularly in the context of 
development assistance) occurs in the global South, seemingly enlisting 
the subject being measured in self-regulation.53 
This form of control and regulation has been called “government at a 
distance.”54 We are all familiar with forms of control and regulation 
through standards created to inspire performance and improvement. 
These standards simultaneously promote “self-governance among the 
governed”55 in ways that have become so naturalized and ingrained that 
we rarely question these forms of social control and self-control. Common 
examples of self-governance through numbers that are rarely questioned 
include grades and GPAs, SAT and LSAT scores, U.S. News and World 
Report higher education rankings, reports to donors evaluating project 
outcomes, and even indicators for faculty productivity pegged to allocation 
of academic research grants.56 
The World Bank’s turn to gender indicators57 has tended to be both 
top-down and bottom-up, with its WBL program relying on input from in-
country practitioners to document national laws as well as World Bank 
databases to collect information on women’s rights issues selected by the 
                                                                                 
50 Merry, Measuring the World, supra note 13, at S88. Merry points out: 
Political debates about compliance shift to arguments about how to form an indicator, 
what should be measured, and what each measurement should represent. . . . The 
outcomes appear as forms of knowledge rather than as particular representations of a 
methodology and particularly political decisions about what to measure and what to call 
it. 
Id. 
51 Id. at S88. 
52 John M. Conley, Comment, 52 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY S93 (Apr. 2011) (response to 
Merry, Measuring the World, supra note 13). 
53 Merry, Measuring the World, supra note 13, at S89–S90, S93. 
54 NIKOLAS ROSE, GOVERNING THE SOUL: THE SHAPING OF THE PRIVATE SELF (1989). 
55 Merry, Measuring the World, supra note 13, at S89. 
56 Id. at S89–S90. But see Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Law School Matrix: Reforming 
Legal Education in a Culture of Competition and Conformity, 60 VAND. L. REV. 515 (2007) 
(criticizing the LSAT). 
57 For other examples of the World Bank’s turn to gender indicators, see, e.g., 2012 WDR 
ON GENDER, supra note 14. The Bank also launched the Gender Data Portal in 2012. Kim, supra 
note 2. 
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WBL program.58 Perhaps because the Bank functions as both a bank that 
can resource gender equality through its financial assistance and a social 
justice agency, it provides both top-down and bottom-up support when 
working with national and subnational governments. An example of the 
Bank’s experience with supporting bottom-up development is its support 
for the establishment of the National Solidarity Program in Afghanistan, 
built on the idea that “[l]ocal villages can and should take responsibility 
for their own development.”59 
The role of gender indicators in the WBL program can be understood 
as advancing (yet falling short in realizing) three transformative projects: 
feminist transformation, legal transformation, and economic 
transformation. 
Feminist transformation: First, on the feminist theory front, the 
history of the WBL program is one reflecting a classic example of what we 
might think of as Governance Feminism, with feminists within the World 
Bank developing and gaining acceptance for gender indicators within the 
context of an institution whose approach to development is deeply 
informed by quantitative indicators. Feminist economists and lawyers 
infiltrated the Bank, using the language of banking, to develop gender 
indicators that help advance a legal and economic justice reform agenda 
for women and girls. The WBL is a cross-disciplinary enterprise of 
lawyers, economists, and other experts, who bring a variety of 
understandings about feminism to the table, often in consultation with 
outside stakeholders in poor countries in which the Bank works as well as 
with elite development professionals and advocates who can access the 
Bank’s elaborate organizational structure. In developing and advancing 
gender indicators, feminists within the World Bank have used the 
“master’s tools” (quantitative metrics) to reform, not transform, the 
“master’s house” (the World Bank). 
Legal transformation: Second, on the legal reform front, the WBL 
program uses gender indicators to measure progress in women’s rights. 
However, the use of gender indicators reveals several limitations about 
law, development, and the use of quantitative empiricism to draw 
conclusions about law and development. An initial limitation is that, 
despite their appearance of scientific objectivity, indicators are far from 
neutral and rest on normative assumptions about which legal rights are 
counted, how they are counted, and what the goals of legal reform should 
                                                                                 
58 WORLD BANK & IFC, WOMEN, BUSINESS, AND LAW 2014: REMOVING BARRIERS TO 
ENHANCE GENDER EQUALITY 6 (2014), http://wbl.worldbank.org/Reports [hereinafter 2014 WBL 
Report] (this was the most recent report available at the time of this writing, with the first 
biennial report having been issued in 2010). 
59 ISOBEL COLEMAN, PARADISE BENEATH HER FEET: HOW WOMEN ARE TRANSFORMING THE 
MIDDLE EAST 188 (2013) (discussing how the visionary behind the National Solidarity Program 
was a former World Bank official, Ashraf Ghani, who went on to become Afghanistan’s finance 
minister (after the fall of the Taliban) and was elected to the Afghan presidency in 2014. 
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be.60 Another limitation is that legal variables are challenging to measure 
“in the face of legal complexity and uncertainty.”61 A final limitation 
worth raising here is that since the notion of development is in itself 
contested, measuring how legal rights and law reform advance 
“development” turns on a contested idea that itself may be problematic, if 
the path to development is one that replicates existing structures of 
dominance and subordination in “developed” countries.62 
Economic transformation: Third, on the economic front, while the 
WBL program does not provide funding itself, its gender indicators are 
used by other agencies that make funding decisions. As an international 
financial institution, the World Bank generally sits at a pivot point 
between public and private international governance to move money and 
resources. Substantially more money and resources began to flow to so-
called “gender-informed” projects from FY 2010 to FY 2012,63 with the 
total share of “gender informed” lending rising from 54 to 83 percent 
during this time period.64 According to the Bank, “[t]his translates into a 
dollar figure in FY12 of almost US$29 billion in gender-informed loans, 
out of a total lending envelope of US$34 billion.”65 The work of the WBL 
program has arisen within this context. However, it is not clear how 
much of this represents new investment, as opposed to merely recasting 
                                                                                 
60 For example, there is substantial debate about how to measure the right to be free of 
gender-based violence. As Sally Engle Merry notes, there has been disagreement about whether 
and how to measure the severity and extent of violence; whether to include mental or 
psychological violence; how to account for the potential underreporting of violence against 
women to law enforcement; and whether to take into account subjective factors such as fear of 
violence. Merry, Firming Up Soft Law, supra note 39, at 25, 26, 36 (“[T]he content of indicators is 
fundamentally shaped by a focus on what is countable and what forms of data already exist or 
can be acquired in a way that seems ‘objective.’ The [violence against women] surveys simplify 
the category of severe physical violence and drop fear and stalking in order to have an 
apparently objective measure.” Id. at 36.). 
61 See, e.g., Kevin E. Davis & Michael B. Kruse, Taking the Measure of Law: The Case of the 
Doing Business Project, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1095 (2007) [hereinafter Davis & Kruse, Taking 
the Measure of Law]. 
62 Id.; see also Trubek & Santos, New Critical Practice, supra note 15. Despite the 
complexities of quantifying legal rights (or perhaps because of these complexities), my interest in 
selecting the World Bank’s WBL program as a focus of this chapter was to focus on an initiative 
in which law is doing some work. 
63 “ ‘Gender informed’ means that gender has been taken into account in at least one of 
three dimensions—analysis, actions, and monitoring and evaluation.” WORLD BANK, UPDATE ON 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GENDER EQUALITY AGENDA AT THE WORLD BANK GROUP 15 (Sept. 
21, 2012), available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DEVCOMMEXT/
0,,pagePK:64000837~piPK:64001152~theSitePK:277473~contentMDK:23276764,00.html. 
According to the Bank, the benefit of approaching “gender-informed” projects with regard to 
these three dimensions “is its simplicity and that it is amendable to self-assessment, thereby 
increasing accountability [and ease of application, since] the ratings on each dimension are 
binary, not subjective judgments about quality.” Id. at 16, box 5. 
64 Id. at 15 (and 16, for chart). The Bank reports that “[f]our out of five projects approved by 
the Board in FY12 were gender informed.” 
65 Id. at 15. However, the Bank makes the caveat that “[i]t is important to recognize that 
the corporate commitments to assess gender mainstreaming are applied at the ex ante stage—
relating to the design and objectives of the operations. As such, these are important instruments 
for enhancing accountability, but do not function to capture results on the ground.” Id. at 16. 
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investments that would have been made in any event. The value of 
increasing investment in “gender-informed” projects will depend on the 
extent to which these investments actually make a difference in 
improving the lives of the women who are the beneficiaries of these 
projects.66 
One large donor partner, the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation 
(MCC) is a development agency that relies heavily on the set of gender 
indicators compiled by the World Bank’s WBL program. The MCC was 
established by Congress in 2004 as an independent bilateral U.S. foreign 
aid agency based on President George W. Bush’s call for a “new compact 
for development, defined by new accountability for both rich and poor 
countries alike.”67 
While the WBL program provides a broad array of data about gender 
inequality, the MCC has translated these data into a composite “Gender 
in the Economy Indicator,” which was added in 2012 to the MCC’s list of 
“selection criteria” for making determinations over allocation of 
development aid to eligible countries.68 As a single composite score, the 
“Gender in the Economy Indicator” has the benefit of simplicity and 
marketability (internally and externally), but it has the downside of 
potentially diluting explanatory power by synthesizing the complexity of 
gender equality into one number. 
Thus, the WBL’s gender indicators have traveled from an 
international institution (the World Bank) to a U.S. agency (the MCC), 
and then overseas, through the MCC’s international assistance program. 
Prospective grantees are encouraged to improve gender equality laws and 
policies that affect their MCC Gender in the Economy Indicator score. 
II. THE RISE OF INDICATORS AS GOVERNANCE 
The rise of gender indicators is part of a wider trend regarding 
indicators as governance. Indicators are “technologies of knowledge 
developed in the economic domain [that have] move[d] uneasily into . . . 
newer fields.”69 Indicators “promis[e] greater specificity . . . and 
                                                                                 
66 Cf. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) 15–24 Audit 
Report, Afghan Women: Comprehensive Assessments Needed to Determine and Measure DOD, 
State, and USAID Progress (Dec. 2014) (noting that U.S. agencies have failed to provide a 
comprehensive assessment confirming that the gains Afghan women have made—which these 
agencies tout and take credit for—are actually traceable to development assistance), available at 
http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR–15–24–AR.pdf. 
67 Press release from the White House on President George W. Bush’s announcement of the 
Millennium Challenge Account (Mar. 14, 2002), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/
infocus/developingnations/millennium.html. 
68 MCC, GUIDE TO THE INDICATORS AND THE SELECTION PROCESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015, 
available at https://www.mcc.gov/pages/docs/doc/report-guide-to-the-indicators-and-the-selection-
process-fy-2015 [hereinafter MCC, GUIDE]. 
69 Merry, Measuring the World, supra note 13, at S88. 
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definitions of compliance yet import[ ] new ambiguities[.]”70 Established 
initially in the context of business transactions and financial 
management, indicators involve “[p]ractices of measuring phenomena 
that are relatively easily counted, such as money or inventories of goods, 
[but that have been] transplanted into domains far less amenable to 
quantification, such as frequency of torture or prevalence of ill health.”71 
While “[i]ndicators are a basic technology of corporate management and 
control . . . [t]he spread of its techniques of auditing and counting to the 
state and civil society is an instance of [ ] seepage of the corporate form.”72 
Because the development assistance field is dominated by economists, it 
has quite readily adopted indicators as a technology for producing and 
disseminating knowledge. 
This chapter borrows the working definition of “indicator” used by 
Davis, Kingsbury, and Merry, who “subsume[ ] indexes, rankings, and 
composites which aggregate different indicators” to refer to: 
a named collection of rank-ordered data that purports to 
represent the past or projected performance of different units. 
The data are generated through a process that simplifies raw 
data about a complex social phenomenon. The data, in this 
simplified and processed form, are capable of being used to 
compare particular units of analysis (such as countries or 
institutions or corporations), synchronically or over time, and to 
evaluate their performance by reference to one or more 
standards.73 
From measures of the ease of doing business to the enjoyment of 
basic human rights, the practice of auditing has exploded within global 
governance institutions, ranging from the World Bank’s Doing Business 
project to treaty bodies, spearheaded by the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights.74 “[W]ith their apparently simple and 
straightforward meanings,” the reliance on numbers “produces an 
                                                                                 
70 Merry, Firming Up Soft Law, supra note 39, at 22. 
71 Merry, Measuring the World, supra note 13, at S88; see also id. at S89 (noting also that 
“[q]uantification . . . become[s] increasingly important to a variety of government and business 
functions . . . from developing cost-benefit measures for locating railroad lines to the need to 
measure life spans by life insurance companies”). 
72 Id. at S90–S92 (pointing to various ways the boundaries between corporate and other 
domains of society have become blurred and intertwined, including indicator-based funding, 
outsourcing of data collection and evaluation to private-sector consultants, and the use of 
indicators in corporate responsibility programs, such as the U.N. Global Compact). Indeed, “[t]he 
expansion of indicator technology into new domains and spaces of governance is another way the 
corporate form is reshaping contemporary social life.” Id. at S93. 
73 Davis, Kingsbury & Merry, Global Governance by Indicators, supra note 19, at 6. 
74 See, e.g., Davis & Kruse, Taking the Measure of Law, supra note 62, at 1095; AnnJanette 
Rosga & Margaret L. Satterthwaite, The Trust in Indicators: Measuring Human Rights, 27 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 253 (2009); see also Davis, Kingsbury & Merry, Global Governance by 
Indicators, supra note 19, for a broader collection of examples. 
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unambiguous and easily replicated field for judgment.”75 Indicators are 
alluring because they appear objective, neutral, and “evidence-based.”76 
“Numbers have become the epitome of the modern fact,” which is “basic to 
the ways Westerners have come to know the world.”77 However, the use of 
indicators often masks a large degree of subjectivity and ideology. 
While indicators are typically developed by experts with experience 
in statistics and other technical fields, “successful” indicators can gain 
acceptance by broader publics, sometimes to such a great extent that they 
can come to stand in for the underlying phenomenon they were intended 
to measure.78 “[S]uch categorization gradually becomes an accepted ‘black 
box’ which no longer needs to be explained and justified,” thereby 
producing a kind of “truth” or “illusion of knowledge”—“a way to know a 
world that is unknowable and to govern a world that is ungovernable.”79 
In the development assistance field, the Human Development Index 
(HDI) is an example of a prominent indicator that enjoys broad 
acceptance.80 Instead of focusing primarily on economic growth through 
Gross National Product (GNP), the HDI follows Amartya Sen’s capacities 
approach to development by measuring other indicators of well-being, 
                                                                                 
75 Merry, Measuring the World, supra note 13, at S88. 
76 Rajiv Shah, Message from the Administrator, in USAID, POLICY, supra note 14, at iv 
(explaining that the gender policy “provides guidance on pursuing more effective, evidence-based 
investments in gender equality” and supports “requirements to ensure that every strategy and 
project is shaped by a gender analysis and establishes common indictors for judging our 
success”). 
77 Merry, Measuring the World, supra note 13, at S89 (citing MARY POOVEY, A HISTORY OF 
THE MODERN FACT: PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE SCIENCES OF WEALTH AND SOCIETY (1998)). 
78 Merry, Firming Up Soft Law, supra note 39, at 29–34. 
79 Id. at 29, 34, 37, and 37, respectively. For a thoughtful discussion of this, consider Sally 
Engle Merry’s cautionary note: 
One of the puzzles of indicators is the extent to which they are used and even 
considered reliable despite widespread recognition of their superficiality, simplification, 
and neglect of context and history. . . . This is a seductive form of knowledge. It 
promises certainty and clarity and provides readily comparable information that 
facilitates decision-making. [T]his apparent clarity accounts for their growing 
popularity. Indicators and other numerical forms of knowledge subdue the thorny 
difficulties of making decisions about incommensurable social practices, issues, and 
problems. 
Id. at 37. See also the work of scholars in science and technology studies, who have provided 
insight regarding the consequences of classification on knowledge production. See, e.g., 
GEOFFREY C. BOWKER & SUSAN LEIGH STAR, SORTING THINGS OUT: CLASSIFICATION AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES (1999); BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION: HOW TO FOLLOW SCIENTISTS AND 
ENGINEERS THROUGH SOCIETY (1987); THE MUTUAL CONSTRUCTION OF STATISTICS AND SOCIETY 
(Ann Rudinow et al. eds., 2011). 
80 Davis, Kingsbury & Merry, Global Governance by Indicators, supra note 19, at 20 (citing 
as other prominent examples Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, 
Freedom House’s Freedom in the World indicator, and the World Bank’s Doing Business 
indicators); see also Wendy Nelson Espeland & Michael Sauder, The Dynamism of Indicators, in 
GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS: GLOBAL POWER THROUGH CLASSIFICATION AND RANKINGS 86 
(Kevin E. Davis et al. eds., 2012) (focusing on U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT law school and other 
educational rankings as another example of a prominent indicator). 
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such as access to health and education.81 The HDI reports assert that 
“non[-]income measures [of well-being] should be an integral component 
of any assessment of well-being as they measure important aspects of 
well-being directly, while income is only one among several inputs 
generating such well-being.”82 When the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) first introduced the HDI as part of its first annual 
Human Development Report, the HDI initially spurred debate because it 
expressed development through an index that ranked countries based on 
their human development and on combined economic and social factors. 
This debate spawned discussion about what the index meant and how it 
would be used.83 But within a year or two, it became “settled” as the new 
normal and is now virtually “presented as a fact about a country, without 
further debate or deliberation.”84 
The fact that such indicators—and the norms they embody—are 
typically developed by technical experts, rather than by governance 
structures that are more open and transparent, raises accountability 
questions and can make such indicators hard to contest. At the same 
time, because indicators themselves are seen as being scientific, objective, 
and neutral, they possess an authority, impartiality, consistency, and 
efficiency that is attractive.85 
III. THE EMERGENCE OF GENDER INDICATORS 
The WBL indicators can usefully be considered within the broader 
ecology of gender indicators. Before turning to analyze the World Bank’s 
WBL program, this section summarizes three prominent sets of gender 
indicators in the law and development field in the context of: (1) the 
UNDP Human Development Index and Report, (2) U.N. Millennium 
Development Goals, and (3) the World Economic Forum.86 While these 
three sets of indicators are composites of data, as discussed further below, 
the WBL program’s biennial reports provide responses to questions that 
reveal simple statistics to “yes/no” questions on legal differentiations (i.e., 
“Can women work the same night hours as men?”).87 
                                                                                 
81 Amartya K. Sen, Foreword, in READINGS IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: CONCEPTS, 
MEASURES AND POLICIES FOR A DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM vii–xiii (Sakiko Fukuda-Parr & A.K. 
Shiva Kumar eds., 2005); see also SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra note 26. 
82 Kalpana Bardhan & Stephan Klasen, UNDP’s Gender-Related Indices: A Critical Review, 
27 WORLD DEV. 985 (1999) [hereinafter Bardhan & Klasen, UNDP’s Gender-Related Indices] 
(emphasis in original). 
83 Merry, Firming Up Soft Law, supra note 39, at 8, 29. 
84 Id. at 8, 30 (noting that this “norm settling process”—the “process of creating and then 
accepting an indicator as a relatively reliable form of knowledge”—typically takes years). 
85 Davis, Kingsbury & Merry, Global Governance by Indicators, supra note 19, at 13–15. 
86 While this chapter focuses on gender indicators in the context of law and development, 
the U.N. Secretary-General has also recommended gender indicators as part of its 
implementation of U.N. Security resolutions on women, peace, and security. 
87 2014 WBL Report, supra note 59. 
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UNDP Gender Indicators: 
The construction of gender indicators in the development field 
emerged in response to earlier indicators that were viewed as 
insufficiently attentive to gender, such as the HDI.88 
In its 1995 Human Development Report—which focused on gender—
UNDP introduced two new gender-related indexes: the Gender-related 
Development Index (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment Measure 
(GEM). The GEM gauged women’s empowerment by measuring women’s 
agency in political and economic life. By contrast, the GDI factored gender 
inequality into the overall HDI assessment, modifying the HDI by 
imposing a welfare penalty for gender inequality in the HDI’s 
components—life expectancy, educational attainment, and per capita 
gross domestic product (GDP).89 To obtain the GDI, the HDI was adjusted 
downward to the extent there were gender gaps in these three areas, in 
effect, “penalizing” the HDI if gender inequality existed.90 
In response to criticism—both conceptual and methodological—of the 
GEM and GDI,91 UNDP launched the Gender Inequality Index (GII) in 
the 2010 Human Development Report. The GII seeks to deliver a 
comprehensive picture of gender inequality by measuring women’s status 
in three dimensions: empowerment, economic activity, and reproductive 
health. It is unique from other indices in that it focuses on critical issues 
of educational attainment, economic and political participation, and 
female-specific health issues. The GII marks an improvement over the 
GEM and GDI, in that the GII permits analysis of women’s issues not 
only in relation to men, but also in light of issues that do not affect men in 
a comparable way (like reproductive health). A further improvement is 
that the GII uses a more holistic approach by capturing components that 
were previously gauged with separate empowerment and development 
indices.92 
                                                                                 
88 Caren Grown, Indicators and Indexes of Gender Inequality: What Do They Measure and 
What Do They Miss?, in EQUALITY FOR WOMEN: WHERE DO WE STAND ON MILLENNIUM 
DEVELOPMENT GOAL 3?, at 93 (Mayra Buvinić et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter Grown, Indicators 
and Indexes of Gender Inequality]. 
89 Id. at 93, 114. 
90 Id. (explaining that the greater the gap between men and women in the HDI 
components, the more the GDI varied from the HDI); see also Bardhan & Klasen, UNDP’s 
Gender-Related Indices, supra note 83, at 985–86 (noting that more so than the GEM, “the GDI 
suggest[ed] that gender inequality is not only a problem for those it disfavors, but that it detracts 
from overall development in a country”). 
91 Amie Gaye et al., Measuring Key Disparities in Human Development: The Gender 
Inequality Index, UNDP Human Development Research Paper Series 2010/46 (2010) [hereinafter 
Gaye et al., Measuring Key Disparities]. 
92 Id. 
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U.N. Millennium Development Goals Gender Indicators: 
A separate set of gender indicators emerged in the context of the 
U.N. Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).93 The U.N. Millennium 
Declaration identifies eight development goals with time-bound targets 
and quantifiable indicators.94 The goal for gender is embodied in the third 
goal, MDG3, whose objective is to “promote gender equality and empower 
women.”95 The target for MDG3 is to “eliminate gender disparity in 
primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and at all levels of 
education no later than 2015.”96 Measuring progress toward this target 
was operationalized as the ratio of girls’ to boys’ enrollment in primary, 
secondary, and tertiary education. Three additional official indicators 
were added for MDG3, including: ratio of literate females to literate 
males among 15- to 24-year-olds; the percentage of nonagricultural wage 
employment that are women; and the proportion of parliamentary seats 
held by women.97 
While seen as useful by international development professionals, the 
official MDG3 indicators came under strong criticism.98 The Millennium 
Project Task Force on Gender Equity suggested 12 indicators to replace 
the official MDG3; however, many of the recommended indicators 
required data that were not widely available.99 The World Bank’s 2007 
Global Monitoring Report (GMR) suggested a more modest, feasible list of 
supplemental indicators to complement, rather than replace, the official 
MDG3 indicators,100 which feminist economists within the World Bank 
who helped pioneer these additional indicators referred to as the “MDG3 
plus” approach.101 
                                                                                 
93 Goal 3: Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women, UN.ORG, http://www.un.org/
millenniumgoals/gender.shtml (last visited Aug. 16, 2013) [hereinafter Goal 3]. 
94 U.N. General Assembly, United Nations Millennium Declaration, Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 
18, 2000). 
95 Goal 3, supra note 94. 
96 Id. 
97 Mayra Buvinić & Andrew R. Morrison, Introduction, Overview, and Future Policy 
Agenda, in EQUALITY FOR WOMEN: WHERE DO WE STAND ON MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOAL 
3?, at 1 (Mayra Buvinić et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter Buvinić, Introduction]. 
98 Andrew R. Morrison et al., The State of World Progress, 1990–2007, in EQUALITY FOR 
WOMEN: WHERE DO WE STAND ON MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOAL 3?, at 33, 34 (Mayra 
Buvinić et al. eds., 2008). 
99 Id. at 35. 
100 Id. 
101 Buvinić, Introduction, supra note 98, at 10 (“The additional indicators recommended in 
our MDG3 plus approach are: i) primary completion rates disaggregated by gender; ii) under-five 
mortality rates disaggregated by gender; iii) percentage of reproductive-age women and their 
partners using modern contraception; iv) percentage of 15- to 19-year-old girls who are mothers 
or pregnant with their first child; v) labor force participation rates for 20- to 24- and 25- to 49-
year-olds, disaggregated by gender; and vi) average hourly wages, also disaggregated by 
gender”). 
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The World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index: 
Another prominent gender indicator, the Global Gender Gap Index, 
was introduced in 2006 by the World Economic Forum.102 The Index 
“convert[s] data into male/female ratios, which are then truncated 
according to an ‘equality benchmark’ and a somewhat elaborate weighting 
procedure.”103 This index includes five components of gender inequality: 
economic participation, economic opportunity, political empowerment, 
educational attainment, and health and well-being. While it originally 
included female-specific measures (as does the Gender Inequality Index) 
as well as gender gaps, it now includes only achievement disparities 
between men and women.104 
The World Bank’s Women, Business, and Law Gender Indicators: 
In contrast to the three composite indicators discussed above, the 
World Bank’s WBL biennial reports focus on a narrower set of concerns 
involving gender equality in work and business. Further, it provides 
“yes/no” responses to questions, which reveal individual data on legal 
differentiations and are illustrated through various charts and diagrams. 
The WBL program measures how laws, regulations and institutions 
“differentiate between women and men in ways that may affect women’s 
incentives or capacity to work or to set up and run a business.”105 In 2014, 
the WBL program issued its third biennial report on legal differences 
based on gender. The 2014 report included 143 economies, covering six 
subject areas (accessing institutions, using property, getting a job, 
providing incentives to work, building credit, and going to court).106 
Methodologically, the data collected by in the WBL report are based on a 
wide array of information, including survey questions answered in-
country as well as verification against the text of laws in each country.107 
                                                                                 
102 Global Gender Gap, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, http://www.weforum.org/issues/global-
gender-gap (last visited Aug. 20, 2014). 
103 Gaye et al., Measuring Key Disparities, supra note 92, at 6–7. 
104 Id. at 7. 
105 Press Release from World Bank and IFC, Many Societies Gradually Moving to Dismantle 
Gender Discrimination, Yet More Can Be Done, Says World Bank Group President Jim Yong 
Kim (Sept. 26, 2013), available at http://wbl.worldbank.org/reports [hereinafter Press Release 
from World Bank and IFC]; see also About Women, Business and the Law, WORLD BANK, http://
wbl.worldbank.org/aboutus (last visited July 6, 2015). 
106 Press Release from World Bank and IFC, supra note 106. Significantly, the 2014 report 
also pilots a new “protecting women from violence” indicator, which is new since the 2012 report.  
This pilot covers 100 countries.  2014 WBL Report, supra note 59, at 4. 
107 The 2014 WBL report includes indicators constructed through answers by in-country 
practitioners with expertise in family and labor law, representatives of civil society organizations 
who work on gender issues.  These responses were verified by cross-checking: 
codified sources of national law, such as constitutions, marriage and family codes, labor 
codes, passport procedures, citizenship rules, inheritance statutes, land laws, gender 
equality law, civil procedure codes, electoral laws, and social security codes.    
2014 WBL Report, supra note 59, at 6. 
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However, as mentioned earlier, once the MCC obtains the WBL data, 
it collapses it into a composite “Gender in the Economy Indicator.” In fact, 
the MCC bases its composite indicator on a more limited set of activities 
than are covered in the WBL report.108 
President George W. Bush paved the way for the MCC, which was 
established to “deliver smart U.S. assistance by focusing on good policies, 
country ownership, and results. . . . [The MCC was designed to] benefit[ ] 
both developing countries and U.S. taxpayers through: competitive 
selection[,] country-led selection[, and] country-led implementation[.]”109 
It has provided over $8.4 billion, based on “Scorecards” it calculates to 
“evaluate policy performance [based on] objective and quantifiable policy 
indicators in three broad policy categories: Ruling Justly, Investing in 
People, and Encouraging Economic Freedom.”110 
The “Gender in the Economy Indicator” was added in 2012—to much 
fanfare—as a “selection indicator” (for selecting aid recipients) under the 
“Encouraging Economic Freedom” rubric (though it relates to the other 
two policy categories—“Ruling Justly” and “Investing in People”—as 
well). Girls’ education—both primary school completion and secondary 
school enrollment—were already included as independent MCC 
indicators,111 but there had been no indicator on adult women. The 
“Gender in the Economy Indicator” utilizes the WBL data, although 
simplified to one number, through which MCC “measures the [aid-
recipient] government’s commitment to promoting gender equality by 
providing women and men with the same legal ability to interact with the 
private and public sector.”112 
In its guidelines explaining its indicators and aid selection process, 
the MCC states two rationales linking greater economic equality for 
women to growth and poverty reduction.113 The first rationale is that 
                                                                                 
108 While the WBL’s 2014 report posed 103 questions across the six main topics covered, the 
MCC bases its Gender in the Economy Indicator solely on ten activities: (1) getting a job, (2) 
registering a business, (3) signing a contract, (4) opening a bank account, (5) choosing where to 
live, (6) getting passports, (7) traveling domestically, (8) traveling abroad, (9) passing on 
citizenship to their children, and (10) becoming heads of households. Compare Id. at 45 and 
MCC, Gender in the Economy Indicator, https://www.mcc.gov/pages/selection/indicator/gender-
in-the-economy-indicator (under “Methodology”). 
109 About MCC, MCC, http://www.mcc.gov/pages/about (last visited Mar. 25, 2013). The 
MCC was established largely in reaction to the view that the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) had many different, conflicting goals, frequently growing out of political 
pressure and not resulting in long-term economic progress. Patrick Cronin, The Rebirth of 
USAID, DAILY CALLER (May 4, 2010), http://dailycaller.com/2010/05/04/the-rebirth-of-usaid/ 
(“The problem is not so much USAID as the proliferation of goals and authorities and earmarks 
that have often satisfied Washington’s powerbrokers at the expense of promoting development 
around the world”). 
110 MCC, GUIDE, supra note 69. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. (under “Gender in the Economy Indicator”). 
113 The MCC favors indicators that, inter alia, have a clear theoretical or empirical link to 
economic growth and poverty reduction. Id. (under “Guide to the MCC Indicators”). 
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studies show that gender inequality significantly harms the economic 
growth of a country aid recipient, as inequality “prevents a large portion 
[of] the population from fully participating in the economy[.]”114 Women 
are underrepresented in the formal labor market and as entrepreneurs 
and are overrepresented in the “female” informal sector, which depresses 
wages in the “female” sectors.115 The second rationale is that “[r]esearch 
shows that when women have access to employment, investment in 
children’s health, nutrition, and education often increases, promoting 
higher levels of human capital.”116 Both of these rationales are 
instrumentalist, viewing women’s equality as important not necessarily 
for the sake of women, but rather to grow national economies or improve 
the well-being of children. 
IV. CRITICISM OF GENDER INDICATORS 
While the criticisms of most of the gender indicators are 
methodological, the concerns raised about the World Bank’s WBL 
program are more broadly conceptual and have been raised openly by the 
program itself. 
The World Bank’s Women, Business, and Law Gender Indicators: 
Due to the newness of both the World Bank’s WBL program and the 
MCC’s “Gender in the Economy Indicator,” there is little independent 
analysis of these initiatives. However, the WBL has undertaken a self-
assessment and acknowledges the shortcomings of its 2014 report, 
indicating that these omissions are grounded in methodological 
limitations:117 
De jure, not de facto inequality: In focusing exclusively on de jure 
inequality, the WBL 2014 report “recognizes the often large gaps between 
law on the books and actual practice[,] [and that] women do not always 
have access to the equality that may be theirs under formal law.”118 This 
focus on de jure inequality is based on the fact that it is easier to identify 
the text of the de jure law than it is to measure de facto inequality. While 
conceding the lack of coverage of de facto inequality as a limitation, the 
WBL 2014 report notes that identifying de jure inequality “is one step 
towards better understanding where and how women’s economic rights 
may be restricted in practice.”119 
                                                                                 
114 Id. (under “Gender in the Economy Indicator”) (“Studies show that legally sanctioned 
gender inequality has a significant negative impact on a country’s economic growth because it 
prevents a large portion [of] the population from fully participating in the economy, thus 
lowering the average ability of the workforce.”). 
115 Id. 
116 Id.  
117 2014 WBL Report, supra note 59, at 5. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
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Formal, not informal economy and other factors: While the 2014 report 
recognizes that “most women in developing economies start businesses or 
work in the informal economy,” the report focuses on the formal economy, 
as a main goal is to identify barriers women face in transitioning from the 
informal to the formal economy.120 The report also acknowledges, but does 
not measure factors referred to as “infrastructure,” such as safe 
transportation and good street lighting, which “might also affect women’s 
ability and desire to work in certain locations or at night.”121 
Customary law partially included: The 2014 report does not cover the 
actual application of customary law in any detail, even while recognizing 
that “customary law can determine a woman’s rights to marriage or in 
property an inheritance[.]”122 However, the report does cover the 
constitutional treatment of customary law, including “whether customary 
law is exempt from constitutional provisions on nondiscrimination.”123 
Because customary law exists in parallel with formal legal regimes, the 
former can determine a woman’s rights in marriage, property, and 
inheritance, often providing different rights to women than the formal 
legal system does. 
Parental leave and child care responsibilities: The 2014 report recognizes 
that “[e]qualizing rights to work may not necessarily result in more 
women entering the workforce, if they are still expected to be the primary 
care-givers for their children, and if access to child care is limited.”124 The 
2012 report had downplayed data on child care – because such issues are 
not always related to facially explicit gender differentials – which was a 
limitation in the earlier report.125 Where there were gender differentials 
in the law, the 2012 report still down-played, for example, parental leave 
benefits, because “legal differentiation in this area is the norm, not the 
exception.”126 The 2014 covers parental leave and related issues more 
significantly, which is an improvement.127 
The problem of composite indicators: As discussed earlier, the MCC has 
conflated the WBL’s data into the composite “Gender in the Economy 
Indicator.” While its simplicity may have helped make it saleable 
internally and helped its marketability, synthesizing gender equality into 
a single score risks failing to capture the complexity of gender inequality 
in the economy. 
                                                                                 
120 Id.  
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 5. The report goes on to say that customary law is only partially included “due to 
the difficulties in defining its rules.” Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 13. 
126 Id. 
127 2014 WBL Report, at 10. 
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Importantly, WBL and MCC staff recognize that the numbers cannot 
tell the full story. “When you put a number on something, people think 
that’s the only thing that matters [when, in fact,] it’s just a starting 
point.”128 Acknowledging the need for a broad framework, the 2014 report 
recognizes that “[e]qual opportunities for women in business and the 
workplace depend on the interplay of various economic, social and 
cultural factors.”129 
Critiques of Other Global Gender Indicators: 
Much of the criticism of the other gender indicators has tended to be 
based on the way these indicators have been conceived, interpreted, and 
deployed—rather than questioning the normative implications of relying 
on indicators as a way of evaluating gender justice. 
Feminist economist Caren Grown does an impressive job of 
summarizing the criticisms of the GDI and GEM,130 which led to their 
being replaced by the GII. The GDI had “conceptual and empirical 
problems associated with both the life-expectancy and earned-income 
components.”131 Furthermore, the GDI was “difficult to interpret in a 
situation in which gender gaps in the three components [life expectancy, 
educational attainment, and income] favor one sex in one component and 
another in the other components[, a] problem [that] applies as well to the 
GEM[.]”132 
There were also challenges associated with the use of the GDI, 
without reference to the HDI.133 The GDI results were meaningful only 
when read in combination with the results of the HDI. 
The GEM also suffered from conceptual and empirical issues. 
Because it used unadjusted income per capita, “women in rich countries 
appear relatively more empowered than women in poor countries with 
otherwise equal relative shares of economic and political power.”134 
Moreover, by “combining absolute levels of human development with 
relative female well-being, [it was] difficult to sort out which is changing 
over time—women’s relative status or levels of development[.]”135 
Further, GEM’s heavy emphasis on representation at the national 
                                                                                 
128 WBL staffer phone interview (03.28.13). 
129 2014 WBL Report, supra note 59, at 5. 
130 Grown, Indicators and Indexes of Gender Inequality, supra note 89, at 114. 
131 Id. at 115. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 114 (“The GDI is not interpretable in itself. . . . Yet countries, and even the UN 
Human Development Reports, have interpreted the GDI a measure of gender inequality[,]” 
reflecting the “great demand and a need for a direct gender inequality measure.”). 
134 Id. at 115. 
135 Id. 
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political level and in the formal economy obscured the important role 
women play in local institutions and grassroots organizations.136 
The GII was established to address these concerns. However, some of 
those who have been involved in administering it have noted substantial 
challenges, including: (1) lack of gender disaggregated data, (2) time 
series data and data availability across time and across space, and (3) 
more consistent measurement (for example, to make international 
comparisons more meaningful).137 
Critics have also discussed a number of data problems with the 
MDG3 indicators, including availability and quality of data; the difficulty 
of quantifying women’s empowerment; and the fact that a narrowing of 
any particular gender gap, such as a wage gap, might indicate declines for 
men rather than improvements for women.138 There are also reporting 
problems and other challenges associated with collecting data on violence 
against women.139 
V. NORMATIVE AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
OF GENDER INDICATORS FOR THE 
FEMINIST PROJECT 
This chapter concludes with the following thoughts on the normative 
implications of relying on indicators as a way of evaluating gender justice. 
Building on the critiques summarized above, this part analyzes these 
normative—and by extension related practical—implications of prevailing 
gender indicators and the motives underlying them. 
Many of the existing gender indicators reflect a thin, formal approach 
to gender equality. Considered within the framework of feminist accounts 
of international law, many of these indicators largely fit within first-
wave, formal feminist approaches. First-wave liberal assimilationist 
feminism argue that women should seek to be more like men by becoming 
                                                                                 
136 Bardhan & Klasen, UNDP’s Gender-Related Indices, supra note 83, at 1002. 
137 Gaye et al., Measuring Key Disparities, supra note 92, at 28. 
138 Grown, Indicators and Indexes of Gender Inequality, supra note 89, at 114; see id. at 95, 
96, and 98 (discussing each data problem, respectively). On empowerment, Grown notes proxies 
for measuring women’s empowerment, including: 
(i) decision[-]making over expenditures and resource allocation, social and domestic 
matters (for example, cooking), and child-related issues (for example, well-being, 
schooling, health); (ii) control over resources (income, assets, unearned income, welfare 
receipts, household budget, participation in paid employment); and (iii) mobility or 
freedom of movement. Measures of the process of female empowerment are more 
difficult; most available indicators tend to measure the enabling factors or conditions for 
empowerment, such as labor force participation, female literacy or school enrollment, 
and political representation by women. [However,] [o]nly one of these—the share of 
seats in national parliaments held by females—is included among the official indicators 
for monitoring progress toward MDG3.” 
Id. at 96. 
139 Id. at 113. 
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better educated, obtaining higher paying jobs, and spending less time in 
the private sphere of the family and more time in the public sphere of 
politics and the market. Gender indicators largely reflect a concern with 
this type of formal equality. 
In response to this formal equality approach, second-wave cultural 
feminists asserted that the first-wave liberal assimilationists neglected to 
challenge the fundamentally problematic value system that associates 
femininity with inferiority. On this view—represented for example in 
Carol Gilligan’s “different voice” theory140—feminism should validate 
qualities historically associated with femininity and activities historically 
assigned to women, such as mothering and caregiving more generally.141 
The strand of development literature that mirrors second-wave cultural 
feminism most closely is the focus on women’s agency, but as Caren 
Grown notes, “Measures of the process of female empowerment are more 
difficult; most available indicators tend to measure the enabling factors or 
conditions for empowerment, [which in turn rest on indicators of formal 
equality,] such as labor force participation, female literacy or school 
enrollment, and political representation by women.”142 
Third-wave structural feminism claims the earlier feminist 
approaches share a common flaw by leaving the essentialist conceptual 
dichotomy between men and women intact. Hence, liberal feminism fails 
to value femininity, while cultural feminism, “even as it challenges the 
prevailing devaluation of femininity, runs the risk of tacitly legitimating 
women’s marginalization by underscoring how different they are from 
men.”143 Third-wave feminism—represented by Catharine MacKinnon, 
for example144—insists on deconstructing the structures of dominance 
and subordination that trap women. On this view, meaningful equality 
requires moving beyond formal equality to substantive equality. 
The gender indicators discussed in this chapter have limited capacity 
either to deconstruct structures of dominance and subordination or to 
pave the way toward new structures that move societies toward 
substantive equality. Instead, these gender indicators are geared toward 
measuring and coaxing inclusion of women in existing structures, which 
are largely defined by traditional “male-oriented” models of success (i.e., 
that fail to value traditionally female-dominated forms of unpaid or 
underpaid work, such as caregiving). Moreover, given their interest in 
promoting consistency that enables comparison across countries and 
                                                                                 
140 See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). 
141 Amy Allen, ‘Mommy Wars’ Redux: A False Conflict, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2012), http://
opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/27/the-mommy-wars-redux-a-false-conflict/?emc=eta1 
[hereinafter Allen, ‘Mommy Wars’ Redux: A False Conflict]. 
142 Grown, Indicators and Indexes of Gender Inequality, supra note 89, at 96. 
143 Allen, ‘Mommy Wars’ Redux: A False Conflict, supra note 141. 
144 See, e.g., CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1988). 
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across time, the gender indicators surveyed here tend to simplify complex 
social relations and strip them of context and history.145 Perhaps better-
designed indicators could address these shortcomings, or perhaps we need 
to look beyond indicators to supplement them with other forms of 
knowledge, including surveys, case studies, and more broadly qualitative 
information. 
To address the various concerns raised throughout this chapter, 
gender indicators would need to advance approaches that are more 
genuinely feminists in their operation—as well as their aspiration. For 
example, gender indicators could utilize the feminist methodology of 
participatory decision-making (including in the creation of the indicators 
themselves). Participatory decision-making could more effectively disrupt 
existing structures of dominance and subordination. Such bottom-up 
strategies could also pave the way to solutions that are more responsive 
to affected individuals and communities, who will have a greater stake 
and deeper investment in sustaining solutions they are involved in 
developing. Thus, these approaches can be more effective as a practical 
matter as well as more respectful of the integrity of individuals whose 
lives are being measured by indicators. 
In sum, rather than co-opt global governance, gender indicators have 
been co-opted by global institutions. Because of their current 
methodological, conceptual, and normative limitations, gender indicators 
are not capable of securing more fundamental transformation of global 
governance. Indicators are a classic governance device. As with other 
indicators, gender indicators replicate and promote the characteristics of 
governance that have emerged in the eras of enlightenment, science, and 
modern government, including individualism, rationalism, objectivity, 
and accountability. Yet, quantitative measurements only create the 
perception of objectivity, neutrality, and transparency. Indicators, in fact, 
embed normative assumptions. 
Given the technical nature of indicators, technocrats end up wielding 
power in debates over data, shifting the conversation from norms to 
numbers. The fact that many leading technocrats are educated in the 
global North reifies existing inequalities in global governance, by 
empowering those who govern from afar over those immediately affected. 
In this sense, the World Bank WBL case study reflects Audre Lorde’s 
famous point that the master’s tools cannot dismantle the master’s 
house.146 
                                                                                 
145 Cf. Sakiko Fukuda-Parr et al., The Power of Numbers: A Critical Review of MDG Targets 
for Human Development and Human Rights 2 (Harv. Sch. Pub. Health Working Paper Series, 
May 2013), http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Gender/Synthesis%20
paper%20PoN_Final.pdf (noting the reductionism in the way the MDGs’ targets were set and 
“the potential for distorting priorities and marginalizing, or even displacing, important human 
development and human rights concerns inherent in such global goal-setting exercises”). 
146 LORDE, supra note 9. 
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Governance almost certainly has a deradicalizing effect on feminism, 
even as feminists have come to power in international institutions, in 
foreign ministries, in parliaments, and as heads of state. As a mechanism 
of governance, gender indicators seek to institutionalize gender equality 
and thereby reshape policies, priorities, and laws in both international 
and national law and development efforts. But the reach of gender 
indicators will continue to be limited so long as they are used primarily to 
mainstream women into existing structures of power, rather than to 
transform those structures. 
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